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TRANSFER OF FEDERAL OFFENSES COMMITTED IN
MORE THAN ONE DISTRICT OR DIVISION

Lester B. Orfield*
21 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the
proceeding as to him to another district or division, if it appears from
the indictment or information or from a bill of particulars that the
offense was committed in more than one district or division and if
the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the proceeding should
be transferred to another district or division in which the commission
of the offense is charged."1
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I
The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contained no provision analogous to the present Rule 21 (b). To the
contrary, Rule 82, modeled on Civil Rule 82, provided that these rules
"shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district
courts of the United States or the venue of criminal proceedings
therein." But the annotation points out that on August 8, 1941 a
committee for the District of Colorado suggested that the defendant
should be indicted in the district where he is operating or the greater number of victims are located and not in some far off district merely to give
the prosecution an unfair advantage. The second draft, dated January
12, 1942, was also silent, as was the third, dated March 4, 1942. Rule
1 (a) of both the second and third drafts provided that jurisdiction and
venue were not affected by the Rules.
The fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942, was the first draft to provide
for transfer as to an offense committed in two or more districts. Rule
22 (a) provided as follows: "... if the indictment or information
shows that the offense charged was committed in more than one
district, the court may on motion transfer the proceeding to any other
district in which the indictment or information shows the offense to
have been committed. No such transfer shall be ordered unless the
court has obtained the approval of the senior circuit judge of the circuit
in which the proceeding was instituted, and if the transfer is to a
district in another circuit the court shall obtain the approval of the
• Professor of Law, Indiana University, School of Law, Indianapolis Division; Member
United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.-Ed.
118 U.S.C. (1946) §687 at p. 1971.

senior circuit judge of that circuit." The fifth draft, dated June 1942,
by'•its Rule 23 (a), was to similar effect. It was, however, made clear
that the motion must be made by the defendant and that transfer be
"required in the interests of justice." The annotation pointed out
that the "provision is applicable particularly in conspiracy cases where
the overt acts charged have been committed in several districts and
in other cases of this nature."2 This draft was submitted to the Supreme
Court for comment by it. The Court as a whole offered no comment
or suggestions as to this rule. A single justice queried: "Is it not now
covered by statute?"
Rule 43 (d) (2) of the sixth draft, dated the winter of 1942-1943,
was in substantially the same form as Rule 23 (a) of the fifth draft.
Rule 40 (c) (2) of the First Preliminary Draft, dated May 1943 (the
seventh committee draft) was similar, except that the provision for
obtaining approval of the senior circuit judge was omitted and that
the rule now provided for transfer to another division as well as district.3 The Second Preliminary Draft, dated February 1944 (the
eighth committee draft), in its Rule 23 (b) was like the seventh draft
except that it provided that the court "shall" transfer instead of "may"
transfer, and that it was given a separate paragraph instead of including
it in the same paragraph that dealt with transfer for prejudice in the
district or division. Rule 23 (b) of the Report of the Advisory Committee, dated July 1944 (ninth draft), was similar to the eighth draft
except in one small respect: the eight draft provided "if the indictment
or information charges an offense," et cetera, while the ninth draft
provided "if it appears from the indictment or information or from
the bill of particulars that the offense was committed," et cetera. The
United States Supreme Court made no change with respect to this
rule of the ninth draft. Because ·two prior proposed rules, Rule 15
on pre-trial procedure and Rule 16 on notice of alibi, were rejected
by the Court, the final rule became Rule 21 (b).
The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee
on the rule as it appeared in the First Preliminary Draft (seventh
draft). The United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Georgia raised the question "that the transferee judge or United States
Attorney should concur before a cause is transferred as provided for in
2 The annotation goes on: "See, e.g. U.S.C., Title 18, §88 (Conspiring to commit
offenses against the United States), §338 (Using mails to promote frauds; counterfeit
money), §408 (Motor vehicles; transportation, etc., of stolen vehicles)."
8 The annotation states: "The rule does not affect the defendant's right to have a
change of venue under U.S.C., Title 18, §338 a (Mailing threatening communications),
§408 d (Threatening communications in interstate commerce)."
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this rule."4 The United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois felt that the venue selected as to a conspiracy charge might be
rather arbitrary and ill considered "depending on the particular view
that that particular judge in that particular district takes on the government's case which it doesn't know anything about except in reading
the indictments."5 Using the example of a mail fraud charge, the
United States Attorney for Minnesota pointed out that the United
States Attorney of the district where the motion to transfer is made
might have required a year to assimilate the case whereas the United
States Attorney in the district to which transfer is sought might be
wholly unfamiliar with the case. Hence there should be no transfer
without his consent. 6 The following comments were made on the
Second Preliminary Draft: The Tennessee federal judges thought
the rule unnecessary. The prior practice of adjustment by the United
States attorneys was preferable.7 The United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York asked: 'What is intended by the
phrase 'in the interest of justice?' "8 If it meant that the defendant
should be prosecuted in the district of his home or business, there
might be cases in which his home or business was not in the district to
which the case was transferred. Furthermore, there would be hardship
on the government as "it would mean the transfer to the other district
or division of the prosecuting official, the government agents, the
documentary evidence, and the government witnesses." Transfer for
prejudice under Rule 21 (a) is not comparable as the transfer there
involved "is justified in order to assure to a defendant a fair and
impartial trial.''

II
The right to trial by a jury selected from the vicinage has existed .
since Magna Carta. But Parliament from time to time enacted statutes
transferring the place of trial from one county to another.9 These
statutes sometimes provided for transfer of crimes committed in the
thirteen Colonies to England for trial. The colonists opposed chiefly
the removal of cases involving charges of treason.10 The Declaration
4 CoMMENTs, REcoMMENDATIONS AND SucmisnoNs IlECJ!IVED CoNCJ!RNING nm
POSED FEDERAL RULBs op CRIMINAL PnoCJ!DUIU!, Vol. II, p. 518 (1944).

Id.
Id.
7 Id.
8Id.
r;

6

PRo-

at 518.
at 519.
vol. ID, p. 84.
at 84.

9 OnFIELD, CmMINAL PROCEDURE PROM AruulsT TO APPEAL 353-354 (1947).
lO Blume, "The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases," 43 MICH. L. REv. 59 at 65 (1944).
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of Independence objected to "transporting us beyond Seas for pretended
offenses." Article 3, section 2, of the Constitution gave the federal
criminal the minimum of protection that his "Trial shall be held in
the State .where the said Crimes shall have been committed."11 The
Sixth Amendment provides that the "accused shall enjoy the right to
a ... trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."12 Thus when a state contains
several districts the defendant has the right to a jury of the particular
district of the crime.13 Literally read, the Constitution thus requires
trial in the state and by a jury of the state and district in which the
crime was committed.14 The Sixth Amendment, literally construed,
guarantees a jury of the district and not a trial in the district. But the
cases construe it as guaranteeing a trial in the district.1 5 The Sixth
Amendment requires further that the "district shall have been previously ascertained by law." The defendant need not have been physically present at the time the crime was committed.16 There has been
a similar trend among the newer states to guarantee the right of a
state defendant to trial in the county in which the crime was committed.11
The situations just discussed have involved constitutional rights of
the defendant. Congress by statute has given the defendant additional rights. Title 18, section 3235 provides: "The trial of offenses
punishable with death shall be had in the county where the offense was
11 But if the crime is not "committed within any state, the trial shall be at such
place or places, as the Congress may by law have directed." 18 U.S.C. §3238 provides
that the trial of such crimes "shall be in the district where the offender is found, or into
which he is first brought." See Dobie, ''Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States
District Court," 12 VA. L. REV. 287-288 (1926).
12The prosecution must prove such venue, United States v. Gillette, (2d Cir. 1951)
189 F.(2d) 449 at 452.
13 The language of the amendment prevails as being the last expression of the
lawmaker. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 at 68-69, 24 S.Ct. 826 (1904); see
United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 at 275, 65 S.Ct. 249 (1944).
14 Blume, "The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases," 43 Mi:cH. L. REv. 59 at 60, 66, 93
(1944).
15 Re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 at 265, 10 S.Ct. 1034 (1890); Cook v. United States,
138 U.S. 157 at 181, 11 S.Ct. 268 (1891); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344
at 381, 26 S.Ct. 688 (1906); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 at 473, 30 S.Ct. 249 (1910);
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 at 233, 44 S.Ct. 519 (1924); United States v. Johnson,
323 U.S. 273 at 275, 65 S.Ct. 249 (1944); Ron-scHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 783 (1939).
10 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 at 386, 26 S.Ct. 688 (1906); Armour
Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 at 76, 28 S.Ct. 428 (1908).
17 Blume, "The Place of Trial in Criminal Ca•es," 43 Mi:cH. L. REv. 59 at 92-94
(1944). See AMERICAN LAw lNsTITIITE CoDE oF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ,I240 (1931);
NATIONAL CoNFEIIENCE oF CoMM1ss10NERS ON UNIFORM STATB LAws, UNIFORM RtILEs
OF CRIMINAL PnocEDURE, Rule 33 (Sept. 1951).
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committed, where that can be done without great inconvenience."18
Likewise under the older 28 U.S.C. section 114, trial was to be in the
division of the district in which the crime was committed unless the
defendant's motion for transfer to another division of the district was
granted. This statutory rule was substantially incorporated into Federal
Criminal Rules 18 and 19. No statute provided generally for transfer
as to crimes committed in two or more districts or divisions. Rule 21 (b)
thus represents an addition to the rights of a defendant established
solely by rule of court.19 Together with Rules 20 and 21 (a) it represents the latest advance in placing a defendant in a· favorable position
as to venue. There seems to have been no movement among the states
to adopt a rule similar to Rule 2l(b).20 This is quite natural as the
degree of hardship involved in most state cases will be small because
the geographical distances involved are so different.
It should be observed that when a transfer is granted or denied
under Rule 21 (b) no question of constitutional rights is involved as
the offense was committed in both districts. 21 There would be a
violation of the Sixth Amendment only if "no part of the offense had
been committed" in the district.22 The situation is wholly unlike those
under Rules 20 and 21 (a) for in those cases the proceeding is transferred to a district in which no part of the offense was committed.
What purpose was served by the adoption of Rule 21 (b)? The
answer may be most graphically stated by considering venue in conspiracy cases. Such venue may be laid in any district in which an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed as well as at
the place of agreement.23 Justice Jackson has recently stated in a
18 This

provision goes back to the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Stat. L. 73).
U.S.C. §1404 (a) "effected a similar change in respect to Government civil
cases." United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (D.C. D.C. 1949) 83 F. Supp.
233 at 235.
The British criminal law provides for transfer. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EvmENCl! &
PRACTICl!, 32d ed., 103 (1949); l & 2 Geo. 6, c. 63, '1!ll; OnPmLD, CRIMINAL PnoCEDtnm
PROM ARREST TO APPEAL 353-354 (1947).
20 Both the AMERICAN I.Aw lNsTITUTB Co»B 011 CRIMINAL PnocEDtnm (1931) and
the NAnoNAL CoNI'ERENCl! 011 CoMMISSIONERS ON UNII'OR.'\l STAT.I! LAws, UNII'ORl\.l
RuLEs 011 CRIMINAL PROCl!Dtnm (September 1951) are silent on the subject, though both
provide for change of venue for prejudice.
21 The Constitution does not require that an equivocal statute be construed as
creatiog a crime committed only in one district. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S.
273 at 275, 65 S.Ct. 249 (1944).
2 2 Kott v. United States, (5th Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 984 at 987.
23 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S. Ct. 793 (1912). For the able
dissentiog opinion of Justice Holmes, in which Justices Lurton, Hughes and Lamar
concurred, see 225 U.S. 384-391. At p. 387 Holmes points out that "this is one of the
wrongs that our forefathers meant to prevent." The British rule of today is as broad as the
American. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EvmENcB & PRACTICl! IN CRIMINAL CASES, 32d ed.,
1453-1455 (1945).
19 28
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concurring op1mon: "An accused, under the Sixth Amendment, has
the right to trial 'by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.' The leverage of a conspiracy
charge lifts this limitation from the prosecution and reduces its protection to a phantom, for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have
been committed in any district where any one of the conspirators did
any one of the acts, however innocent, intended to accomplish its
object. The Government may, and often does, compel one to defend
at a great distance from any place he ever did any act because some
accused confederate did some trivial and by itself innocent act in the
chosen district. Circumstances may even enable the prosecution to
fix the place of trial in Washington, D.C., where a defendant may
lawfully be put to trial before a jury partly or even wholly made up
of employees of the Government that accuses him." 24
Federal Rule 21 (b) is thus a recognition that the "preferential
position of the Government was inherently unfair and needed modification in order that the Government and defendants might approach
some degree of equality" in the choice of forum. 25 Federal judges
should "not be denied all power to check attempted unfairness by a
too zealous government."26

III
Aside from Rule 21 (b) there is "no authority for a transfer to
another district.''27 Even the Supreme Court is restricted, Justice
Rutledge having stated: "Our general power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts ... does not extend to disregarding a validly enacted and applicable statute or permitting departure
from it, even in such matters as venue."28
Construing the rule, one court has stated that "there are three
prerequisites to the court ordering a transfer of a proceeding of this
24Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 at 452-453, 69 S.Ct. 716 (1949).
Holtzoff, J., in United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (D.C. D.C. 1949)
83 F. Supp. 233 at 234. The statement was made in a civil case applying 28 U.S.C.
§1404 (a).
26 Frankfurter, J., dissenting in United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S.
573 at 601, 68 S.Ct. 1169 (1948).
27 Semel v. United States, (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 229 at 231. Accord: United
States v. National City Lines, Inc., (D.C. Cal. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 393 at 397.
It has been held that under a statute permitting transfer between divisions of a district,
there can be no transfer where a district contains no divisions. United States v. Beadon,
(2d Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 164, cert. den. 284 U.S. 625, 52 S.Ct. 11 (1931).
28 United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 at 589, 68 S.Ct. 1169
(1948).
25
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kind to another district or division: first, the defendant must move
for the transfer; second, it must appear from the indictment or from
a bill of particulars that the alleged offense was committed also in that
district or division to which the defendant moves for transfer of the
proceeding; and, third, the court must be satisfied that in the interest
of justice such transfer should be made."29
As has been seen, the first requisite is that the motion for transfer
be made by the defendant. 30 The right is not confined to the defendant
for constitutional reasons as the offense was also committed at the
place to which transfer is sought. Hence the Constitution does not
stand in the way of amending the rule so as to permit transfer on the
motion of the government or of the court.31 It would be pointless to
extend the right to the government as the government exercised a
choice when it instituted the prosecution. If at some later time the
government regrets its choice, it can always seek a dismissal of the
prosecution, though under Rule 48 (a) this requires the consent of the
court. Another possibility is to let the court of its own motion make
the transfer.32 It is to be doubted that the court is in as good a position
as counsel for defendant to determine where the trial should be had.
The government needs no protection from the judge for the reasons
stated above. If the judge should make a mistake and transfer to a
district where the offense was not committed, the proceedings might
be void as to defendants who protested. Since the defendants did
not move for transfer it would have to be assumed that transfer was
against their wishes. If the court is to be given the power to transfer
of its own motion, the consent of the defendant should be made a
prerequisite.
29 United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1948) 79 F. Supp.
880 at 882. The same analysis is presented in United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951)
95 F. Supp. 544 at 547.
so On the other hand, it has been held under 28 U.S.C. §1404 (a) that a plaintiff
as well as a defendant may move for a transfer in federal civil cases. Otto v. Hirl, (D.C.
Iowa 1950) 89 F. Supp. 72. Noted 35 MINN. L. REv. 96 (1950). Other decisions
are contra. See also 50 MxcH L. RBv. 343 (1951).
31 With respect to the Canal Zone, provision by executive order in 1914 was made
for transfer on application of either the government or defendant to another division of
the district. This was upheld in Fullerton v. Government of the Canal Zone, (5th Cir.
1925) 8 F. (2d) 968 at 970.
Rule 34 of NATIONAL CoNFERENCP. OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws,
UNIFORM RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Sept. 1951) permits the government to have
a change of venue for prejudice.
82 Freed, "The Rules of Criminal Procedure," 33 A.B.A.J. 1010 at 1012 (1947).
Under Rule 33 the court may grant a new trial and under Rule 34 it may arrest judgment
on its own motion. ORFmLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREsT TO APPEAL 499-500,
517-518 (1947). But the possibilities of injury to the defendant thereby are slight.
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It will be noted that the second requisite for transfer is that "the
offense was committed in more than one district or division."33 While
the place to which the proceeding is transferred must be one of such
districts or divisions, it does not follow that the place where the motion
to transfer is made must also be. Thus it would appear that the
Nebraska court erred when it stated that a requirement for transfer
is that the accusation disclose "an offense committed both in the district
in which the prosecution is brought and in the district to which its
transfer is requested, with the consequence that the accusation could
have been made in either district."34 Thus if the offense were committed in Kansas and Oklahoma, but prosecuted in Nebraska, it would
seem that Nebraska could transfer. 35 The rule does not expressly cover
the situation where the offense is committed only in one district or
division and prosecution is brought elsewhere. Literally construed,
the rule would not provide for transfer. 36 Presumably the defendant
would then move to dismiss the indictment in the district of prosecution. Presumably the prosecuting attorney in the district of commission
could commence prosecution without the necessity of a transfer, though
removal proceedings under Rule 40 might be necessary.
Rule 21 (b) covers an offense "committed in more than one district
or division." There has always been much controversy as to when a
crime was so committed both before and after the adoption of the
rule. 37 For example, a district judge held that the crime of evading
military service by making false affidavits could be committed only
at the place where the draft board received the affidavit; the appellate
court agreed to this but admitted that it was doubtful and found it
unnecessary to decide the point.38 With respect to the crime of making
83 Under 28 U.S.C. §1404 (a) the district court may transfer "any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought." This statute assumes
that the action was filed in a jurisdiction where "venue may be properly laid, for if it has not
been so brought, it would be subject to dismissal." United States v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., (D.C. D.C. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 233, 234.
34 United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 544 at 547.
35 Kott v. United States, (5th Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 984 at 987. As a practical
matter the defendant would not move to transfer as he could not be prosecuted at all in
Nebraska.
36 But see Kott v. United States, (5th Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 984 at 987. As to
civil actions, 28 U.S.C. §1406 (a) provides: ''The district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall • • • transfer such case
to any district or division in which it would have been brought."
37 Dobie, ''Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States District Court," 12 VA. L.
REv. 287 at 288-291 (1926). For the English rule see ARcHBoLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE &
PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES, 32d ed., 36-37 (1949).
38 Shurin v. United States, ( 4th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 566 at 569, cert. den.
333 U.S. 837, 68 S.Ct. 608 (1948).
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false statements to the War Assets Administration, a count alleging
this crime must spell out a continuous offense and inferences may not
be drawn from other counts.89 The offense of furnishing a false
statement under the Renegotiation Act was treated as a continuing
offense, the facts being spelled out by a bill of particulars obtained by
the defendants.40 A district court held that causing a letter to be
placed in the mails to defraud was committed only in the district of
mailing, hence if the proceeding has been transferred from the place
of mailing it must be retransferred to such place. Though the court of
appeals dismissed the appeal it concluded that the crime was committed
both at the place of mailing and the place of delivery.41 The statute
spelled out only one crime whereas the district court had erroneously
split it up into three crimes: mailing a letter, causing it to be placed
in any post ·office, and knowingly causing it to be delivered.
Justice Rutledge stated in the opinion of the Court in a civil antitrust case that the Court expressed "no opinion on whether Rule 21
(b) applies to criminal anti-trust prosecutions."42 This statement
should not be taken too seriously. As well stated by Federal District
Judge Delehant: "An appellate court does not damn an inferior court's
opinion by declining to pass upon its correctness, and that is especially
true on occasions when the lower court's ruling is not at all involved
in the matter pending on appeal."48 Title 28 U .S.C. section 1404 (a)
has been held to apply to civil antitrust suits.44 Since it is a counterpart to Rule 21 (b) it would seem that the same rule applies to criminal
antitrust cases. An identical rule would obviously facilitate the litigation of companion criminal and civil cases. Several members of the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee have concluded that the Rule
applies to antitrust cases.411
S9United States v. Hughes Tool Co., (D.C. Hawaii 1948) 78 F. Supp. 409 at 411.
United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1948) 79 F. Supp.
880 at 883-885.
41 Holdsworth v. United States, (1st. Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933 at 935.
42United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 at 593, n. 42, 68 S.Ct.
1169 (1948).
~ 48 United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 544 at 550.
44 United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 69 S.Ct. 955 (1949).
Justices Douglas and Black dissented, and Rutledge concurred only in the result. See
notes 62 H.mv. L. REv. 707 (1949); 58 YALB L. J. 482 (1949); 50 MrcH. L. REv. 345
(1951).
45 Holtzoff, "Reform of Criminal Procedure," 12 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119 at 130
(1944); Youngquist, ''Institute Proceedings," FEDERAL RuLES OF CRIMINAL PnocEDURB
169 at 170 (N.Y.U. ed., 1946); Medalie, id at 274-275; Dession, ''The New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure: II," 56 YALE L. J. 197 at 224 (1947).
40

40

M1cHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

Title 18 U.S.C., section 3237, effective September 1, 1948, is now
the governing statute as to venue of crimes committed in more than
one district. It provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by
enactment of Congress, any offense against the United States begun
in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than
one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which
such offense was begun, continued or completed.
"Any offense involving the use of the mails, or transportation in
interstate or foreign commerce, is a continuing offense and, except as
otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be
inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which
such commerce or mail matter moves."
The annotation points out that this is a complete rewriting of
the former 28 U.S.C. section 103 to clarify legislative intent and
to omit special venue provisions from many sections.46 While the
phrase "committed in more than one district" may be comprehensive
enough to include ''begun in one district and completed in another/'
the use of both expressions precludes any doubt as to legislative intent.
The last paragraph removes all doubt as to the venue of continuing
offenses and makes unnecessary special venue provisions except in
cases where Congress desires to restrict the prosecution of offenses to
particular districts as in I8 U.S.C. section 1073.47 It should be noted
that the statute refers only to offenses in more than one district and
not to offenses in more than one division.
Suppose. the prosecution simultaneously instituted criminal proceedings in each of the districts in which the one continuous offense
was committed. Rule 21 (b) protects the defendant by permitting a
transfer to one single district. Previous to the rule the government
46 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §3237, p. 946. The new statute was cited in United
States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 880 at 885. It was
applied in Stoppelli v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 391 at 395, cert. den.
340 U.S. 864, 71 S.Ct. 88 (1950), as to sale and concealment of heroin; in Goodloe v.
United States, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 188 F. (2d) 621 at 622, as to attempt to bribe. In United
States v. Gillette, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 449 at 452, the court construed the statute
"as broadening, not reducing, the venue jurisdiction inherited from English law." It was
cited in United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 544 at 548; United States
v. Borow, (D.C. N.J. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 211 at 213.
4 7 In United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 at 276, 65 S.Ct. 249 (1944), the Court
had stated: "It is significant that when Congress desires to give a choice of trial, it does
so by specific venue provisions giving jurisdiction to prosecute in any criminal court of the
United States through which a process of wrongdoing moves."

1952]

TRANSFER OF FEDERAL OFFENSES

41

could perhaps have been compelled to elect between the districts.48
Double jeopardy should preclude two convictions.49
Obviously the phrase "in the interest of justice" has a broad meaning.110 For example, Rule 33 provides that the court "may grant a
new trial to a defendant if required in the interest of justice." No
one has ever contended that this phrase in Rule 33 could be narrowly
pinned down. The same would seem to be true of Rule 21 (b).
Judge Yankwich111 has listed eight factors indicating that a transfer may
be in the interest of justice: (I) the defendant has to leave his domicile
to go to a distant place, (2) he must employ counsel in a distant city,
(3) he must bring his witnesses from afar,152 ( 4) a corporation defendant has its business headquarters in another city, (5) a corporation
defendant has its records in another city, (6) another district is robbed
of its rightful jurisdiction, (7) fairness would be absent, and (8)
unjustifiable expense and delay would be eliminated. He did not
indicate that there might not be other factors. In fact, he stated that
"it is quite evident that, in each case, we are called upon to determine
whether, under the particular circumstances of the case, a transfer
would be in the interest of justice."153
Another judge has offered the following definition: "They must
mean the taking into full account of the rights of the accused, the
Government, and the public, that is to say, the promotion of a speedy
and at the same time a fair trial, with appropriate consideration for the
curtailment of unnecessary expense or prolongation of litigation, and in
48 Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 at 234, 44 S.Ct. 519 (1924). This case relied on
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 at 474, 30 S.Ct. 249 (1910).
49Jn re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 7 S.Ct. 556 (1887); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S.
344 at 378-381, 26 S.Ct. 688 (1906); Holder v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 155 Mo.
App. 664, 135 S.W. 507 (1911); State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 93 S. 95 (1922); State
v. Shimmam, 122 Ohio St. 522, 172 N.E. 367 (1930); AMBRICAN LAw lNsTITUTE, CoDB
op CRIMINAL PnoCI!DURB 'i[245 (1931); AMnRicAN LAW lNsTITUTE, ADMINISTRATION
op THB CRIMINAL LAw, Double Jeopardy, 127 (1935); note, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522
at 543 (1940); Kirchheimer, "The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy," 58 YALB L. J.
513 at 539-542 (1949).
150 The British statute uses the phrase "in the interests of justice." But the power to
transfer is vested exclusively in the High Court of Justice. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EvxDBNCB & PRACTICI!, 32d ed. 103 (1949); 1 & 2 GEo, 6, c. 63, ,rll; ORPIELD, CRIMINAL
PnOCI!DURB FROM ARRBST TO APPEAL 353-354 (1947).
215 U.S.C. §1404 (a) provides for transfer of civil cases for "the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice • • • ."
111 United States v. National City Lines, Inc., (D.C. Cal. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 393 at 398.
112 If at the place of intended transfer, a substantial number of witnesses must come
from other districts, transfer has been denied. United States v. Eisler, (D.C.D.C. 1947)
75 F. Supp. 634 at 639.
11s United States v. National City Lines, Inc., (D.C. Cal. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 393 at 398.
To similar effect see United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 544 at 550.
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this connection the relative cost to the parties, their possible embarrassment by reason of absence from their homes and places of business
for extended periods of time, the relative cost and hardship through removal of books and records into another jurisdiction, as against nonremoval."54
If weight is given to a statement of the United States Supreme
Court made forty years before the Rules went into effect, a defendant
should rather easily obtain transfer to the place where he has his home.
Justice Brown stated: "But we do not wish to be understood as approving the practice of indicting citizens of distant states in the courts of
this District, where an indictment will lie in the State of the domicile
of such person, unless in exceptional cases where the circumstances
seem to demand that this course shall be taken." 511
The third prerequisite does not apply to the statute authorizing
change of venue as a matter of right in a limited class of cases.l16
Section 3239 of 18 U.S.C. provides: "Any defendant indicted under
sections 875, 876 or 877 of this title, with respect to communications
originating in the United States, shall, upon motion duly made, be entitled as of right to be tried in the district in which the matter mailed
or otherwise transmitted was first set in motion, in the mails or in commerce between the States."57
It would appear evident that prejudice or bias of the judge is not
a ground for transfer. Instead, as the annotation to the note points
out, it is a ground for change of judge as provided for in the federal
statute.118 While in some states no clear distinction is taken between
change of judge and change of venue, Rule 21 (b) as well as the
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure59 clearly makes
the distinction.
54 United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1948) 79 F. Supp.
880 at 885. For the latest exposition see United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951)
95 F. Supp. 544 at 550-551.
55 Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62 at 78, 25 S.Ct. 760 (1905). While three judges
dissented in this case, they agreed on this point. 199 U.S. 62 at 87-88. This statement
was cited in a case construing Rule 21 (b). United States v. National City Lines, Inc.,
(D.C. Cal. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 393 at 395-396.
56 See note to Rule 21 (b); also the note to Rule 18.
157 This statute became effective September 1, 1948. The annotation to this statute
indicates that it is based on Title 18, 1940 ed., §§ 338 (a) and 408 (d) referred to in the
note to Rule 21 (b).
58 28 U.S.C. § 144, formerly § 25. See OIU'IELD, CRIMINAL PnoCBDURB FnoM Amt:BST
TO AnP.AL 373-376 (1947).
119 Chapter 11.
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To these three prerequisites a fourth should perhaps be added. Rule
22 of the Federal Criminal Rules provides: "A motion to transfer under
these rules may be made at or before arraignment or at such other time
as the court or these rules may prescribe." Thus if the defendant moves
to transfer after arraignment he runs the risk that his motion will be
held untimely. As Judge Parker has said: "As to the basis for the motion, it appears that defendant delayed making it for more than a year
after the indictment had been found against him and until after the
case had twice been set for trial in the Middle District of North Carolina by consent of his counsel, and that no reason for removal was
given based upon anything that had occurred in the meantime. A
transfer under such circumstances would not have been an exercise
but an abuse of discretion." 60
The Rule does not expressly state the earliest time at which the
motion to transfer may be made. However, it would seem that it
could not be made before the finding of an indictment or the filing of
an information since Rule 21 (b) provides that the court shall transfer
"if it appears from the indictment or information or from a bill of particulars that the offense was committed in more than one district or division ...." Thus there could be no motion immediately after an arrest
or a proceeding before a commissioner when these precede an indictment or an information.61
Possibly there is another prerequisite to transfer: namely, that the
defendant contemplated a trial and not a plea of guilty in the transferee district. Under Rule 20 only a plea of guilty may be transferred
to the second district. Rule 21 is entitled "Transfer From the District
or Division for Trial." 62 However, Rule 21 (b) does not itself specify
that the transfer is for trial. It is therefore to be doubted that there
may be transfer only for trial. Furthermore it is arguable that a trial
may consist of pleading guilty and sentencing.63
60 Shurin v. United States, ( 4th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 566 at 570, cert. den.,
333 U.S. 837, 68 S.Ct. 608 (1948). The court did not refer to Rule 22. See also United
States v. Parker, (D.C. N.J. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 450 at 461.
61 But the English rule would permit a motion at this stage. The English Supreme
Court rule permits an application for transfer "either before or after the indictment is
preferred and signed, or found by the grand jury, as the case may be." AnCHBoLD, PLBADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES, 32d ed., 104 (1949).
62 The italics are mine. In United States v. Six Dozen Bottles of Dr. Peter's Kuriko,
(D.C. Wis. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 458, it was held that a transfer for trial did not permit
the transferee district to retransfer.
63 People ex rel. Burke v. Fox, 150 App. Div. 114, 134 N.Y.S. 642 (1912). In
United States v. Gallagher, (3d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 342 at 346, the court stated,
"we assume, without deciding that the proceedings had in the district court upon the
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Nor is it a prerequisite to transfer that the defendant act under advice of counsel.64 It has been held that a defendant may waive trial
by jury without advice of counsel.65 Here no constitutional right of
the defendant is involved, but simply a right given him by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. A single district court decision has
required advice of counsel as to waiver of venue for guilty plea under
Rule 20. 66 The holding was dictum since before the court rendered
its decision, the defendant withdrew her consent to transfer. It appears
to be the practice in the Northern District of California to require
representation of counsel or intelligent waiver thereof as to waiver
under Rule 20.67 It is another matter if the defendant desires counsel.
Under Rule 44 he is entitled to counsel as soon as he "appears in
court." 68 Under Rule 5 (b) he may retain counsel at the proceedings
before the commissioner.
IV

It should not be assumed that the government has acted unfairly in
choosing a particular venue. The government must select a venue
where any of several venues may have almost evenly balanced factors
for and against selection. The choice of the government may be narrowed ''by circumstances of which the public is unaware, such as grand
jury and trial docket congestion in certain districts and the timing of
trial terms of court. " 69
appellant's consent and plea of guilty amounted to a 'trial' in the constitutional sense."
Compare Oclield, "The Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Rule 20," 34 CoRN. L. Q. 129
at 137-138 (1948); note, 46 Mi:cH. L. REv. 964 at 967 (1948).
64 None of the drafts of the Advisory Committee provided for a right to counsel,
whereas the seventh committee draft gave it as to Rule 20. Oclield, "The Constitutionality
of Federal Criminal Rule 20," 34 CoRN. L. Q. 129 at 150 (1948).
65Adams, Warden v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 at 275, 63 S.Ct.
236 (1942). Three judges dissented. The case involved using the mails to defraud,
thus possibly an offense committed in more than one district.
66 In re Schwindt, (D.C. Ore. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 618. Here of course the defendant
is waiving a constitutional right.
67 Goodman, J., "Revolutionary Procedure in Criminal Actions," 8 F.R.D. 338 at
341-342 (1948). Cf. Hearn v. United States, (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 647 at 649.
68 He would have to appear in court to move to transfer. Compare Fellman, "The
Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Federal Courts," 30 NBB. L. REv. 559 at 587-589;
Council v. Clemmer, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 22, cert. den. 338 U.S. 880, 70 S.Ct.
150 (1949).
69 Dession, ''The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II," 56 YALE L. J. 197
at 225 (1947).
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Rule 21 (b) has been said to leave the question of transfer "to the
discretion of the District Judge" and "merely an erroneous exercise of
that discretion will not require a reversal. An abuse of discretion is
necessary." 70
Federal Circuit Judge John J. Parker has stated that the question
of transfer is one "resting in the sound discretion of the District
Judge." 71 When a motion is denied the presumption is that it is denied
"in the discretion of the trial judges" if nothing appears to the contrary. If the defendant, after overruling of the motion, is convicted,
and then raises the issue of wrongful denial of transfer on appeal, the
burden is on him to show that the motion should have been granted and
that he was prejudiced by the denial. Even if the trial judge had acted
upon the mistaken view that only the place of trial had jurisdiction of
the offense, the defendant bore the same burden. The fact that the
defendant delays in moving for transfer for more than a year after the
finding of the indictment is a factor against him. Thus the appellate
court placed a burden upon the defendant to show prejudice that was
almost insuperable. The purpose of Rule 21 (b) is not to secure a new
trial after conviction. As Judge Parker himself stated, the purpose is
"to expedite trials and give proper consideration to the convenience of
parties and witnesses."
Federal District Judge Delehant has pointed out that prior to Rule
21 (b) the Department of Justice chose the site of prosecution of a multiple district crime and that despite the adoption of the Rule "that
prerogative of the prosecution ought not lightly to be nullified."72
This is particularly true, he contends, if the case has been carried before
a grand jury.73 Good ·order in the management of judicial business
requires that "ordinarily" cases be disposed of where commenced. The
court should not be "unduly solicitous" as to the preferences of a defendant resident in another district who defrauds persons living in the
district from which transfer is sought. If it were proved that general
70 Kott v. United States, (5th Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 984 at 987. The appeal was
after conviction. Also stating that it is a "matter for the discretion of the judge," see
Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933 at 937.
11 Shurin v. United States, ( 4th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 566 at 570, cert. den.
333 U.S. 837, 68 S.Ct. 608 (1948).
7 2 United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 544 at 548.
78 But Rule 21 (b), as it is worded, cannot come into operation until the case has
been carried to the grand jury.
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sentiment or opinion prevailed in the place of intended transfer "improperly tolerant of any misdeeds of the defendant or cynically contemptuous of the plight of his alleged victims," this might be a factor against
transfer. 74
In a case arising before the Federal Rules in which the defendant
had been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to capital
punishment the United States Supreme Court held that a denial of
change of venue because of local prejudice to another division of the
district was not erroneous. "Matters of this sort are addressed to the
discretion of the trial judge, and we find nothing in the record to
amount to abuse of discretion such as would authorize an appellate
court to interfere with the judgment."75 The same question arose as to
the federal statute providing for trial in the county as to capital offenses.
Lower federal court decisions held that the district judge is vested with
discretion to determine the question of "great inconvenience" and that
in the absence of an abuse of this discretion, his determination would be
sustained.76 Transfer under Rule 21 (a) for prejudice has been held
to rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge.77
As, however, the rule provides that the court "shall" transfer the
proceeding there is "thus an element of obligatoriness in the provision
('shall') once a satisfactory showing is made." 78 The fourth, fifth, sixth
and seventh committee drafts of the rule used the word "may." The
eighth and ninth drafts substituted the word "shall."

V
The jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals is ''by 28 U.S.
C.A. §225, limited 'to review by appeal final decisions', with excep74

95 F. Supp. 544 at 551-552.

75 Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S.
76 Case of Fries, (D.C. Pa. 1799) 9

15 at 20, 40 S.Ct. 50 (1919).
Fed. Cas. 826 at 922; United States v. Cornell,
(D.C.R.I. 1820) 25 Fed. Cas. 650 at 654; Brown v. United States, (5th Cir. 1949)
257 F. 46 at 48, reversed on another point, 256 U.S. 335 (1921). The statute is 18
u.s.c. § 3235.
77 Kersten v. United States, (10th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 337 at 339, cert. den.
331 U.S. 851, 67 S.Ct. 1744· (1947); Shockley v. United States, (9th Cir. 1948) 166
F. (2d) 704 at 709, cert. den. 334 U.S. 850, 68 S.Ct. 1502 (1948); Rakes v. United
States, (4th Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 739 at 746, cert. den. 335 U.S. 826, 69 S.Ct. 51
(1948); Dennis v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 986 at 992, cert.
granted, 337 U.S. 954, 69 S.Ct. 1527 (1949).
78 United States v. National City Lines, (D.C. Cal. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 393 at 397. See
Sutton, "Use of 'Shall' in Statutes," 4 JoBN MARSHALL L. Q. 204 at 210-217 (1939).
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tions not applying to criminal cases."70 An appeal by a defendant from
an order denying a transfer "is not from a final decision but from
a preliminary or interlocutory order. It is, therefore, not 'an appeal
permitted by law' ...."80 Similarly it has been held that an order retransferring a case was not a final decision reviewable on appeal to the
court of appeals under 28 U.S.C.A. section 1291.81 As well stated by
Judge Delehant, "That position should prompt a judge in the consideration of such a motion to a degree of care and caution proper in
circumstances involving final or relatively final action upon an important question."82 Since the matter is not one of jurisdiction, if the defendant wishes to be sure of appellate consideration, he must be careful to raise the point in the lower court that the court erred in denying
the transfer.83
The defendant may not take an interlocutory appeal. Nor may the
government.84 Justice Rutledge stated in the opinion of the Court
in a civil case that "it is at least doubtful whether the Government had
a right to appeal from the order of transfer in the criminal case."85
Judge Goodrich stated that his view as to the finality of a transfer order
was "strengthened" by this statement. 86 Moreover, pointing out that
no appeal may be taken from a transfer order in a civil case, he concluded that he could "see no ground for treating Rule 21 (b) differ79 Semel v. United States, (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 229 at 231. See Oal'mLD,
CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 91-93 (1939); Orfield, "A Resume of Supreme Court
Decisions on Federal Criminal Procedure," 21 NBB. L. RBv. ll3 at ll4-ll5 (1942).
so Semel v. United States, (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 231 at 232. This holding
was unnecessary as the time for filing the record on appeal had elapsed. In general a
defendant cannot appeal until after trial and conviction when his motion for change of
venue because of prejudice is denied. ORFIBLD, CRIMINAL PnocBDtllU! FnoM AnnnsT TO
APPEAL 369-370 (1947).
81 Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933. See also Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. l at 4 (1951).
82 United States v. White, (D.C. Neb. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 544 at 550.
83 Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257 at 263, 17 S.Ct. 302 (1897); ORFIBLD,
CRIMINAL APPBALS IN AMERICA 96 (1939); note, 54 HARv. L. RBv. 1204 at 1206-1207
(1941).
84 All the litigated cases involve appeals by defendants.
8 5 United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 at 594, 68 S.Ct. 1169
(1948). In note 43 he stated: ''The precise point apparently has not arisen since the
adoption of Rule 21 (b), but there would seem to be no statutozy basis for appeal from an
order of this type. See 18 U.S.C. § 682. See also Semel v. United States, 158 F. 2d 231,
232." As to mandamus to prevent change of venue in civil cases see 50 MICH. L. RBv. 341
(1951).
86 Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933 at 935.
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ently in this respect from the corresponding civil transfers provisions
of 28 U.S.C.A. §1404."87
A civil case has suggested that while no appeal lies, a denial of
transfer of venue may be reviewed by the court of appeals on mandamus. In the particular case, however, mandamus was denied as there
was no proof of sufficient abuse of discretion. 88 Conceivably, application might be made directly to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. This could well have been tested out as to Criminal Rule 20 but
was not. 89
Possibly the solution is to enact a statute conferring on the court
of appeals authority in its discretion to allow an appeal from an order
denying a transfer. 90 At the same time the statute should provide that
such discretionary appeals are permissive, not mandatory, so that failure to take an appeal will not bar an appeal when the judgment becomes final. In the absence of such a statute there is a temptation for
the appellate court to write an opinion stating that it has no jurisdiction,
but obliquely stating how it would have decided the appeal if it could
have entertained it. 91 British procedure permits an interlocutory appeal to the High Court of Justice, but of course this is more necessary
in Great Britain as there the defendant may be tried in any county or
place in which he is apprehended.92

VI
Difficulty in applying Rule 21 (b) may conceivably arise when
the court of intended transfer would prima facie have jurisdiction
over only part of the counts of the indictment because some of the
offenses were committed wholly outside of the jurisdiction of that
87 lbid. See also Kaufmann, J., "Observations on Transfers Under Section 1404 (a)
of the New Judicial Code," 10 F.R.D. 595 (1951).
88 Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, (2d Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 329, cert. den. 340 U.S.
851, 71 S.Ct. 79, (1950), noted 64 HARv. L. REv. 343 (1950). See also 50 CoL. L. REv.
537 (1950); 50 MicH. L. REv. 341 (1951).
89 Orfield, "The Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Rule 20," 34 CoRN. L. Q.
129 at 152-154 (1948). As to the possibility of such a proceeding as to a civil case under
28 U.S.C., § 1404 (a), see note, 58 YALB L. J. 482 at 488, n. 33 (1949).
·
90 Compare concurring opinion of Frank, J., in Pabellon v. Grace Line, (2d Cir.
1951) 191 F. (2d) 169 at 179-181.
91 This seems to have been done in Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950)
179 F. (2d) 933.
92 AncHBoLD, PLEADING, EvmBNCB & PMcncB IN CRIMINAL CASBS, 32d ed., 35-36
(1949); 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 86, ,rn.
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court. One court has held that this precluded a transfer. 93 The Federal
Rules were said to make no provision for transfer for trial purposes of
only part of the counts of an indictment. The prosecutor could thus
always deny a defendant a transfer simply by adding counts which
allege the commission of the crime in the district in which the proceedings were instituted. Rule 21 (b) should therefore be amended
so that a case may be transferred "in whole or in part." To transfer
the whole proceedings in the instant case would violate the constitutional provisions as to place of trial. But it would appear that venue may
be waived. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has said:
"In any event, the defendant cannot complain about that order because
he made the motion to transfer." 94 Venue is waived where there is a
transfer for prejudice under Rule 21 (a). Likewise it is waived where
there is a transfer for plea and sentence under Rule 20.95 Of course
where there are several defendants, those who oppose transfer should
not be subjected to transfer. There were several defendants in the
instant case. Most of the defendants joined in the motion for transfer
while the others did not resist but in effect joined in the motion. It is
therefore difficult to see in what way any constitutional rights as to
place of trial were violated. The problem of the case might not have
arisen at all if the defendants had availed themselves of Rule 7 (f) to
move for a bill of particulars as the bill might have substantiated their
claim that every count involved an offense committed in both districts.
The district court in Maine arrived at a similar result. Citing the
case from Hawaii, the court stated: "If any part of the indictment is
non-transferable, no part of the indictment may be transferred."96 The
constitutional provisions as to place of trial prevented a waiver as to the
non-transferable part of the indictment. "No action of the defendant
can serve as a waiver of this jurisdictional requirement."97 While an
appeal in this case was dismissed on the ground that a final decision
was not involved, the court stated: 'We want it to be clear that we are
9s United States v. Hughes Tool Co., (D.C. Hawaii 1948) 78 F. Supp. 409. The
court admits that on the facts it would have granted a transfer if only the two multi·
district counts had been placed in the indictment.
94 Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933 at 937.
95 Levine v. United States, (8th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 556 at 558; United States
v. Gallagher, (3d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 342 at 346; Orfield, "The Constitutionality
of Federal Criminal Rule 20," 34 CollN. L. Q. 129 (1948).
96 United States v. Holdsworth, (D.C. Maine 1949) 9 F.R.D. 198 at 202, ''Rule
21 (b) merely makes mention of the transfer of 'the proceedings.'" As to the meaning
of "proceeding" see United States v. Auerbach, (D.C. Cal. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 776 at
780-781.
97 9 F.R.D. 198 at 203.
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neither approving nor disapproving the Hughes Tool Co. case...."98
A month after the Hawaiian case a different and more satisfactory
result was arrived at by another district court.99 This case also involved
several defendants. The court ordered a transfer from Maryland to
Illinois, even though two defendants opposed a transfer. The court
ordered a severance of parties, as is provided for under Rule 14, so as
to transfer those four defendants seeking a transfer.100 The defendants
objecting to transfer were not transferred. The possibility of duplication of testimony was not a bar to transfer. In this case, unlike the
Hawaiian case, the defendants moved for and secured a bill of particulars over the objection of the government. The court permitted
severance of parties for transfer, but not severance of offenses or
counts.101 The court stated: "Also, these four moving defendants do
not contend, and we conclude that they may not successfully contend,
that there may be a transfer of less than the entire proceedings as to
them. That is to say, we conclude there may not be a transfer of one or
more, and not of all counts in the indictment as respects them."102 The
court gave no reason for such distinction. If the parties may be severed,
why not the counts? To summarize the fact, situations may be broken
down as follows: (I) when the accusation contains only one count
and only one defendant is involved, there is no problem of severance;
(2) when the accusation contains only one count and two or more
defendants are involved, severance should be possible;103 (3) when
the accusation contains more than one count and one or more defendants are involved, while on principle severance should be possible, it
has been denied;104 and ( 4) when the accusation contains two or more
counts and two or more defendants and not all of the defendants are
98 Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933 at 935.
99 United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1948) 79
100 The court made no reference to Rule 14.
101 Federal Rule 20 has been construed as not permitting a transfer

F. Supp. 880.

for plea and
sentence where multiple defendants are involved. United States v. Bishop, (D.C. Ore,
1948) 76 F. Supp. 866 at 870. See note, 16 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 187 at 192 (1949).
Section 264 of the AMERICAN LAW lNSTITUTB CoDB OF CRIMINAL PROCBDORB (1931)
permits a severance of defendants as to change of venue for prejudice. But an English writer
would permit the court to transfer as to all defendants. Brunyate, ''The American Draft Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1930," 49 L.Q. REv. 192 at 201-202 (1933).
102 79 F. Supp. 880 at 882.
103 United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1948) 79 F. Supp.
880 at 882. It should be noted that Rule 21 (b) provides that the court "shall transfer the
proceeding as to him." (Italics are mine).
104 United States v. Hughes Tool Co., (D.C. Hawaii 1948) 78 F. Supp. 409 at
410; United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 880
at 882.

1952]

TRANSFER OF FEDERAL OFFENSES

51

charged in each count1° 11 the difficulty is similar to that in the third
situation.

VII
Suppose the motion for transfer is granted, what happens next?
Rule 21 (c) provides: "When a transfer is ordered the clerk shall transmit to the clerk of the court to which the proceeding is transferred all
papers in the proceeding or duplicates thereof and any bail taken, and
the prosecution shall continue in that district or division."108 It would
seem that no duplication of proceedings would be required.107 Indictment or information would be in the district or division in which the
motion was made. Trial would be in the district or division to which
the case was transferred.108 Possibly the rule should be amended to
provide that when disposition has been made of a transferred case, the
clerk of the transferee court must notify the clerk of the court from
which the case was transferred.100 The docket of the case could then
be completed by an official entry of the final disposition of the case.

VIII
May there be more than one transfer of a case? Suppose the case
had been transferred to a district or division in which no part of the
crime had been committed. A district court held that there may then
he a retransfer to the original court under the power of the court to
determine its jurisdiction over the case, rather than under Rule 21
(b).110 While on appeal this case was dismissed on the ground that
a final decision was not involved, the appellate court held that the
court of the district to which transfer is made cannot review the order
1011 See

Federal Criminal Rule 8 (b).
note to this rule refers to the old 28 U .S.C. § 114 and to Federal Criminal
Rule 20. For discussion of such transmission see United States v. Tollett, (D.C. Ore.
1948) 76 F. Supp. 871; Petition of MundorfF, (D.C. Ore. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 7; Singleton v.
Clemmer, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 963.
107 Similarly proceedings are not duplicated as to civil transfers under 28 U.S.C.
§1404 (a). Recent case, 62 HARv. L. REv. 707 (1949).
108 It was held under the old statute 28 U.S.C. § 114 permitting trial within the
division of commission of the crime, indictment could be found in another division of the
district. Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 at 235-237, 44 S.Ct. 519 (1924).
109 The Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit "voted to ask a reconsideration
by the Senior CiJcuit Conference of its refusal to order the recording of a final judgment
in the district where an indictment had been returned, when trial was had in another
district, as permitted under the new criminal Rules." 33 A.B.A.J. 873 at 874 (1947).
110 United States v. Holdsworth, (D.C. Me. 1949) 9 F.R.D. 198 at 203.
106 The
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of transfer, before conviction.111 The defendant could not complain
as he made the motion to transfer, and thus impliedly waived the venue.
The holding was weakened by the fact that the appellate court concluded that the transferee court did have jurisdiction as the crime
was committed in part in that district.
Suppose the transferee court clearly has jurisdiction of the case
as the crime was committed there in part. Can the defendant move to
transfer to a third district or to the court from which the case was
first transferred? In a case rejecting a transfer of a civil antitrust case
prior to 28 U.S.C. section 1404 (a), Justice Rutledge stated: "In view
of our decision in this civil case, there would be nothing to prevent
appellees from making a motion under Rule 21 (b) of the Criminal
Rules to have the criminal case retransferred to the Southern District
of California, if in the changed outlook arising from this decision that
should be their pleasure."112 On the other hand, a subsequent decision
of the First Circuit denied an interlocutory appeal on a refusal to transfer back to the original district.113 Transfer to a third forum would make
long delays likely.114 Most states permit only one change of venue
for prejudice.115 English law does not expressly forbid more than one
transfer.116
Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933 at 937.
United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 at 595, n. 45, 68 S.Ct.
1169 (1948).
11s Holdsworth v. United States, (1st Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 933 at 937.
114 Recent case, 62 HARV. L. REv. 707 at 708 (1949).
115 0nFIELD, CmMINAL PROCEDURE FROM AruulsT TO AP~BAL 370 (1947).
To
the same effect see .AMI!ruCAN LAw lNsTITUTE ConE OF CmMINAL PROCEDURE iI258
(1931). The NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIPoRM STATE LAws,
UNIPORM RULES OF CruMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 34 (Sept. 1951) lays down no limitation. In a civil case it was held that only one transfer was allowable under the transfer
provision of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. United States v. Six Dozen
Bottles of ''Dr. Peter's Kuriko," (D.C. Wis. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 458.
116 AncHBoLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CruMINAL CASES, 32d ed.,
(1949); 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 63, ,in (3).
111
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